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Aspects of Law Reform: An Insider’s Perspective, by JACK STRAW.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, xiv + 77 + (index) 7pp (£12.99 
paperback). ISBN 9781107618169 
 
This book provides a fascinating, and at times uncomfortable, politico-legal insight into the 
views of the former Lord Chancellor, Jack Straw, on some of the most recent reforms to the 
United Kingdom’s justice system. In this trilogy of papers, originally presented in 2012 for the 
64th Hamlyn lecture series, Straw focuses on the future of the criminal courts, the Human Rights 
Act 1998, including Britain’s relationship with the European Court of Human Rights, and, 
finally, judicial appointments. In all three lectures he argues that the justice system is now in a 
healthier state than it has been in his lifetime, but that there remains much room –and need –
for improvement. While some of the lectures contain inevitable levels of party politics, the 
collection is frank in its assessment that more needs to be done to improve diversity for the 
justice system to better reflect the society it serves. For example, Straw does make some, albeit 
controversial, contributions to the arguments favouring positive discrimination in the 
appointment of ethnic minorities and women to the bench, as well as ‘proposals’ to shift the 
boundaries in the use of juries in certain criminal trials (although most of these have now been 
ousted by the current coalition administration). Within all three lectures there is an underlying 
human rights theme, whereby he continuously reasserts the success of the Human Rights Act 
1998. In relation to the Council of Europe, Straw is critical of the role of Strasbourg and sees 
its ‘self-proclaimed’ authority as something that needs to be curtailed,1 although he is emphatic 
throughout in stating that the UK should not leave the European Convention on Human Rights.2 
Aspects of Law Reform will appeal to public, human rights and criminal lawyers with 
an interest in the practicalities of constitutional legal theory from a political perspective. Within 
all three papers there is continuous reference to the role of the State.3 In relation to the rule of 
law, Straw presents somewhat confused discussions pertaining to the future of juries and 
magistrates as mechanisms for upholding democracy, and reflecting the widest possible 
consent from society for the criminal justice system’s decisions. On the one hand he argues 
that critics should have more faith in the value and abilities of lay people, as they act as the last 
line of defence against arbitrary Government.4 In direct contradiction to this, however, Straw 
later argues that juries should be removed from more complex trials such as those pertaining 
to fraud, the Government should revisit the dormant section 43 of the Criminal Justice Act 
2003.5 Straw also discusses the rule of law as a ‘two way street in democracy’ that the European 
Courts of Human Rights is not adhering to through its own judgments.6 In relation to the 
sovereignty of Parliament, he discusses how his legislative programme strengthened the UK’s 
                                                          
1 Page 25 
2 Page 49 
3 Page 49 
4 Page 12 and HL Debates, 15 July 2003, cols. 779-80. 
5 Section 43 was to allow non-jury trials in serious and complex fraud cases where the complexity of the trial, or 
the length of the trial, or both, was likely to make the case too burdensome for ordinary lay people. However 
attempts to bring the section into force were unsuccessful in the House of Lords. Under the current 
administration such proposals have since been repealed by the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 Part 7 s 113 
6 Page 49 
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constitution, with the Human Rights Act 1998 ‘work(ing) with the grain of our constitutional 
arrangements’ through declarations of incompatibility.7  
Of particular interest will be Straw’s discussions relating to separation of powers, 
namely his insights into the relationship between the executive and the judiciary. Straw starts 
the lectures by stating that no matter how inconvenient Government may find the interference 
of judges, a relationship between the two institutions, founded on acknowledgement of 
sovereignty and respect, must be maintained.8 However it would not be surprising if lawyers 
felt particularly uncomfortable with Straw’s suggestion that this mutual respect has not always 
been adhered to, and that some reforms were scuppered by the House of Lords as a consequence 
of the legal profession being overrepresented within the Upper House.9 In particular he cites 
the Mode of Trial Bill of 1999, and how ‘asking barristers to comment on trial by jury is like 
asking pigs what they think of troughs.’10At one point Straw concedes that ‘the judiciary (i.e. 
the Supreme Court) is, rightly so, jealous of its own independence’ when deciding matters of 
Constitutional importance.11 Here one may have expected further analysis of the Constitutional 
Reform Act 2005 than that which is provided. Furthermore readers who believe in strict 
definitions of the doctrine of separation of powers may struggle with Straw’s omission that 
there were areas of concern during his term in office that he wanted the judiciary to resolve 
rather than his office through complex and time-consuming legislative reform, such as those 
following R v Davies.12 Unsurprisingly, throughout all of Straw’s discussions, the underlying 
message is that the doctrines work when they favour the supremacy of Parliament.     
Straw’s first lecture, The future of the criminal courts, is more reflective than suggestive 
of proposals to reform the criminal justice system. He starts his account by reminiscing over 
the elitism of the legal profession when he first started reading law in 1964. In doing so he 
notes how the legal profession was then quarter of the size it is today, with only 2,500 practising 
barristers and 32,000 practising solicitors in England and Wales.13 His reflection continues by 
painting a picture of a statistically less crime-ridden UK in the 1960s (in terms of official 
records), but one which was thwarted by ‘noble cause corruption.’14 In reference to crime 
statistics, and the different labels and categories for offences, he draws difficult comparisons 
in the official criminal activity reports in 1961 and 2012. He also refers to how the police force 
was just 75,000 strong in the 1960s in England and Wales, compared with 134,000 members 
today.15 By Straw’s own admission these figures are not ‘strictly comparable’;16 however he 
nevertheless underestimates the flaws in these comparators. His observations undervalue 
changes in the classifications of crime, for example, in 1961 consensual gay sex would have 
been included in the figures for sexual offences; he does not account for changes in the way 
                                                          
7 Page 11 
8 Page 19 as supported by earlier literature such as C. Campbell-Holt (ed) Lord Woolf: The Pursuit of Justice 
(OUP 2008) pp 131-143 
9 Page 14 
10 Ibid 
11 Ibid 
12 [2006] EWCA Crim 1155 
13 Figures are from the early 1970s. There were 122,000 solicitors in practice 2011 and 15,000 barristers in 
2010.  
14 Page 6 
15 Page 2 
16 Page 4 
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crime is reported, such as those highlighted by the Berry report;17 nor does he account for the 
expansion of criminal activity into more sophisticated emerging areas, such as cybercrime, 
which would affect some of the categories he compares.18  
Furthermore throughout the first paper Straw focuses on the perceived advantages of 
the Human Rights Act 1998 in relation to criminal cases and reporting. He neglects other 
arguably more substantive institutional reforms, such as Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 
1984. PACE would have undoubtedly had a positive effect on explaining the difference 
between the 1961 hallowed ‘golden day’ Dixon of Dock Green bobby on the beat image, 
compared with the 2012 expansion of criminal reporting that he documents. While Straw later 
acknowledges that there are fundamental differences in the criminal justice system of his youth 
compared to today, with such changes including the technical revolution that has led to the 
introduction of new types evidence such as CCTV and DNA to aide prosecutions (for example 
in the poignant case of Stephen Lawrence),19 such points are made in passing, and are at odds 
with his initial comparative statistical analysis.  
The rest of his first paper focuses on changes to the role of the police, juries and the 
lower tier Courts. Here Straw focuses on three areas of concern: jury nobbling,20 the UK’s 
‘unique’ approach to either-way offences;21 and the use of juries in fraud trials.22 Discussions 
relating to jury nobbling are on the whole self-congratulatory of reforms introduced by Straw 
during his term in office (for example the removal of juries from sensitive cases, as happened 
in Twomey and Others).23 In relation to proposals for reform at the lower levels, favourable 
reference is made to Auld’s 2001 recommendations for a streamlined Magistrates Courts, 
District Courts and Crown Court systems,24 and Runcimen’s 1993 Royal Commission 
Report.25 In reality, Straw concedes that Auld’s streamlining proposals will never happen in 
practice, for fear of ‘hollowing’ the criminal justice system. However he suggests that the 
current administration is achieving the recommendations by other, ‘quieter’ means, such as by 
removing legal aid in either-way offences when the defendant later pleads guilty in the Crown 
Court.26  
In his concluding remarks Straw also touches upon two further areas for reform. First, 
and in support of the proposals of the Philips Royal Commission,27 he suggests reforming the 
CPS into autonomous regional prosecution services, so as to better reflect the aspirations of the 
                                                          
17 Berry, ‘Reducing Bureaucracy in Policing’ (October 2010) available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/117162/reduce-bureaucracy-
police.pdf  
18 See further A. Reynolds, ‘Fear of cyber crime on the rise…’ (2013) 15 Legal World 4, and S. Pancholi, 
‘Fighting cybercrime’ (2014) 28 Lawyer 19 available at: http://digitaledition.thelawyer.com/tl-
270114/offline/download.pdf 
19 This is coupled with the removal of ne bis in idem whereby individuals cannot be charged with the same 
offence twice. 
20 Page 12 
21 Page 13 
22 Page 17 
23 [2011] EWCA Crim 8 
24 Rt Hon. Lord Justice Auld, Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales (London: Stationary Office, 
October 2001).  
25 Royal Commission on Criminal Justice 1993, Cm 2263 
26 Page 16 
27 Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, 1981, Cmnd 8092, para.7.24. 
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people within each area.28 In making such assertions he cites Wales as an example of how such 
autonomy is already working satisfactorily in areas such as family law with Cafcass,29 and how 
such benefits could be replicated within the CPS. Second, Straw cites the need to introduce 
advocacy quality assurance safeguards to ensure adequate standards are maintained.30 
However, again these discussions are largely outdated, with the reforms already having been 
introduced.31  
In Straw’s second paper, The Human Rights Act and Europe, he criticises expanded 
interpretations of the European Convention of Human Rights as carrying neither authority nor 
popular consent. While adamant that the UK should remain part of the Council of Europe, 
Straw concedes that Strasbourg needs to heed the ‘Gypsy warnings’32 and revert to its founding 
principles at the end of World War Two.33 Here brief international comparisons are drawn with 
other jurisdictions, such as America and Dred v Scott,34 insofar as he believes that no Court 
enjoys supremacy quite like Strasbourg. With no overriding power over the Court’s decisions, 
he cites Lord Rodger’s Latin epigram that the Court has gratuitously self-proclaimed itself the 
‘Supreme Court of Europe.’35 He also draws references to Baroness Hale’s lecture 
‘Argentoratum Locutum: Is the Supreme Court Supreme?’,36 and AF (No 3).37 
The two core themes of the second lecture are, first the relationship between the Human 
Rights Act 1998 and the UK Courts, and second the relationships between the European Court 
of Human Rights and the Council of Europe.  Straw starts by reasserting the purposes of the 
Human Rights Act as part of the solution to fundamental impediments in the operation of 
democratic politics across Europe. In responses to critics of the 1998 Act, he refers to how the 
majority of the controversies stem not from the Human Rights Act, but human rights in general, 
as can be seen in Chahal38 and McCann,39 both examples of pre-2000 polemics.40 In relation 
to the UK, he discusses how we need to have greater confidence in our higher Courts to arrive 
at their own interpretations of the European Convention, and that, following the cases of 
Alconbury41 and Ullah,42 the UK should reject the mirror principle.43 It is evident that he does 
not subscribe to the argument that giving the Courts this autonomy, and departing from the 
mirror principle, invites the judiciary to stray into new political areas. In support of such a 
                                                          
28 Page 22 
29 See further: http://wales.gov.uk/cafcasscymru/home/?lang=en 
30 Page 23 
31 The Quality Assurance Scheme for Advocates  (QASA) was in place by 2013, see further: 
http://www.qasa.org.uk/ 
32 While Straw does not define his use of the term ‘Gypsy warnings’, one can reasonably infer that he is 
referring to the need for Strasburg to cautiously acknowledge critics of the current human rights system.    
33 Page 25 
34 (1857) 60 US 393 
35 Page 41 
36 B. Hale, ‘Argentoratum Locutum: Is Strasbourg or the Supreme Court Supreme?’ (2012) 12 HRLR 65  
37 Page 40, Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF (No 3) [2009] UKHL 28. 
38 Chahal v United Kingdom no 70/1995/576/662 
39 McCann v United Kingdom (1996) 21 EHRR 97 
40 Page 30 
41 R (Alconbury) v Secretary of State for Environment, Transport and the Regions [2003] 2 AC 295 
42 R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator [2004] UKHL 26 
43 Page 25 
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development he cites Marper,44 Hirst,45 and Al-Khawaya46 as evidence that our judiciary are 
already sensitive to cultural and political norms when interpreting human rights principles.  
Here one would expect Straw to comment upon what resolutions are needed to achieve 
these changes. The second paper offers little in the way of further analysis as to what can be 
implemented within the existing boundaries to resolve these ‘Gypsy warnings’. Here one might 
have expected further discussions pertaining to scope of the margin of appreciation granted by 
the European Court to each State, as well as indications as to how the Court can achieve culture 
change. However, Straw simply states that the problem was caused by ‘them’ and is therefore 
‘theirs’ to fix.47 In doing so his conclusion, (i.e. that Strasbourg should address the issue of 
their own overstretched legitimacy) is an oversimplification of the complexities of reassessing 
and reforming the relationship between the UK and Strasbourg.  
While the second paper presents some valuable insights into the historical development 
of human rights protection in the UK, Straw fails to explain, beyond superficial observations 
pertaining to the mirror principle, how the Human Rights Act would survive and continue to 
protect human rights in the UK in the absence of Strasbourg jurisprudence. Here one would 
expect greater, more jurisprudential, discussions pertaining to section 2 of the Act that are 
omitted from his lectures. While he does not support the idea of leaving the Council of Europe, 
the departing thought in his second paper can be précised as follows: the European Court of 
Human Rights is not the be all or end all of fundamental rights, liberties and freedoms.48 This 
not only presents another contradiction and ambiguity, but also poses more questions relating 
to possible human rights reform than it addresses.  
Straw’s third paper, Judicial Appointments, is set against the political backdrop of the 
time it was written in 2012 (namely the Leveson Inquiry into press regulation,49 Egyptian 
President Morsi’s decree preventing the judiciary from reviewing his decisions, and calls for 
greater gender equality within the Church of England). This third lecture is divided into three 
themes. First, a historical review of how the system for appointing members of the judiciary 
has evolved.50 Second, reflection on what the role of Parliament should be in these 
appointments.51 Finally, consideration of what more needs to be done to speed up progress 
towards a judiciary that is more reflective of society at every level.52  
Discussions start by looking at changes to the role of the Lord Chancellor who was, 
prior to the Constitutional Reform Act (CRA) in 2005, an out-dated ‘holy trinity’ and entirely 
at odds with any Montesquieu-style notion of the separation of powers.53 Straw concedes that 
following the CRA, the role of the Lord Chancellor has been excessively limited and that more 
should be done to reconsider the working relationships (both political and jurisprudential) 
between the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice and the UK Supreme Court.54 In aiding 
                                                          
44 S. and Marper v United Kingdom, no. 30562/04 
45 Hirst v United Kingdom (No 2) (2004) no. 74025/01, 38 EHRR 40 
46 Al-Khawaja and Tahery v United Kingdom, no. 26766/05, [2011] ECHR 2127 
47 Page 49 
48 Ibid 
49 See further: http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk 
50 Page 52 
51 Page 55 
52 Page 60 
53 Page 53 
54 Page 56 
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such discussions Straw cites the Crime and Court Bill 2013, and changes introduced by the 
subsequent Lord Chancellor Clarke that could have been a positive step forward, but which 
Lord Chancellor Grayling has more recently abandoned.55 Frustratingly he again offers little 
more in the way of how the relationships between the judicial leaders could be reformed. 
In Straw’s final paper he presents three arguments that seek to justify the need to 
diversify the judiciary (in terms of gender and minority representation). He starts by arguing 
that if judges are to exercise democratic power, we ‘need a judiciary that looks like ‘Britain’ 
rather than looking like us.’56 Second, that a diverse Court can address a greater range of 
perspectives, life experience and backgrounds, thereby making it ‘better equipped to carry out 
the role of adjudicating.’57 Finally, that if we accept that talent is randomly and widely 
distributed amongst the population, then the under-representation of ‘well-qualified women, 
black…and…Asian judges, gay and lesbian judges, disabled judges, suggests that we are 
missing out on the best’ talent.58 In applying such arguments, Straw makes comparisons with 
attempts to diversify the Civil Service.  
Straw proceeds by exploring how the merit tests for judicial appointments should 
operate alongside positive discrimination considerations. In clarifying his position he states ‘to 
be clear…(appointing)…a woman over an equally meritorious man, or a black candidate over 
an equally meritorious white candidate.’59 However such discussions appear superficial in 
presuming the current merit tests are tangible in identifying candidates of equal worth and 
standing. Straw furthers such discussions by stating how he is ‘wholly in favour…of appointing 
a candidate who comes from an underrepresented group over one who does not.’60 In doing so 
he draws comparisons between judicial appointments and the use of all-women shortlists to 
select parliamentary candidates for the 1997 general election that in turn diversified the House 
of Commons.61 He justifies such analogies as ‘reasonable’ by referring to MPs as lawmakers.62 
However such remarks appear inconsistent with the concept that the UK will only afford 
judicial appointments to the most capable jurists. In this sense the role of the judiciary is 
idiosyncratic when compared with the legislative or executive arms of the State: judges have 
to navigate their way around complex legal rules and linguistic challenges, ultimately to arrive 
at just judgement. The idea that such responsibilities should fall upon anyone other than the 
most qualified and experienced, irrespective of diversity or background, is irrational. Society’s 
views have already been accounted for within the system, insofar as it is our elected officials, 
who we vote for, who make the law. Furthermore, the Judicial Appointments Commission, 
which Straw himself established, was introduced for the very reason of limiting perceived 
prejudice considerations, such as those based on personal characteristics, in the appointment of 
judges.63  
                                                          
55 Page 59 
56 Page 61, here Straw does not give any indication as to whether ‘us’ is in reference to the legal profession, 
politicians, or alternatively State officials as a whole. 
57 Ibid 
58 Ibid 
59 Page 72 
60 Ibid 
61 Page 68 
62 Page 71 
63 See further: http://jac.judiciary.gov.uk/ 
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The underlying question that flows from Straw’s discussion is that of how do we 
achieve diversity, and is there a need to introduce a diversity/equal opportunity criterion as part 
of the judicial appointments process? In response to such one may turn to the thoughts of Lord 
Sumption when he called for an ‘honest public debate about the hitherto unmentionable subject 
of positive discrimination’ within judicial appointments.64 He classified such proposals as 
‘patronising’ on two grounds. Firstly on the basis that if you dilute the principle of selecting 
only the most talented candidates by introducing criteria other than individual merit, the result 
will be a bench with fewer outstanding judges. Secondly, if a criteria pertaining to positive 
discrimination was to be introduced, such may lead to an adverse effect on the groups of people 
who would be inclined to make applications. Adopting these thoughts, it is instead argued that 
Straw’s proposals should have focused on the current opportunities available to ethnic 
minorities and females, in terms of education and career progression. 
However, this is not to suggest that Straw’s arguments are completely without merit. 
The House of Lords recognises that ‘justice, fairness and equality are central values in the law 
which should be reflected in the composition of the judiciary itself,’65 and currently slow 
progress is being made to diversify the bench.66 Furthermore, in support of Straw’s arguments, 
Malleson has disproved some of Lord Sumption’s concerns by noting that, at Supreme Court 
level, the fact that two judges must come from Scotland and one from Northern Ireland is 
evidence that such positive discrimination can exist within the boundaries of the merit tests.67 
For her, taking into account diversity considerations no further limits the pool of potential 
candidates than these requirements that are already in place.  
 
Throughout this book the underlying theme is that historically the UK is resistant to 
law reform. When PACE was first introduced there were fears that it would infringe the rights 
of the individual.68 Similarly when the Human Rights Act was first being drafted there were 
public concerns that more law would actually amount to less freedom, despite the laudable 
aims of the Act.69 As Straw puts it, there is always ‘sound and fury,’70 however once the 
legislation has been passed the public have been able to see the reforms for what they are: 
sensible and measured. Consequently, ‘the very same pressure groups that have been making 
their extravagant predictions abandon their campaign and move onto the next thing.’71 One 
possible reason for this is that as a nation we perceive ourselves as so ‘obviously compliant’ 
with the rule of law, democracy requirements, and our fundamental human rights obligations 
                                                          
64 Lord Sumption, ‘Home Truths about Judicial Diversity’, Bar Council Law Reform Lecture, 15 November 
2012, available at www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/speech-121115-lord-sumption.pdf  
65 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Judicial Appointments, 28 March 2012.   
66 See further E Rackley, Women, Judging and Judiciary: From Difference to Diversity (Routledge, Oxon 2013) 
and K Malleson 'Diversity in the judiciary: The case for Positive Action' (2009) 36 Journal of Law and Society 
376 and  
67 See further K Malleson, ‘The case for gender quotas for appointments to the Supreme Court’, UK Supreme 
Court Blog, 23 May 2014, available at http://ukscblog.com/case-gender-quotas-appointments-supreme-court and 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005 s 27 (8) 
68 Equality and Human Rights Commission, Review of the Use of Stop and Search Powers in England and 
Wales (London, March 2010) available at http://www.equalityhumanrights.com 
69 See further J. Donnelly, Universal Human Rights: In Theory and Practice (2nd edn Cornell University Press 
NYC 2003) and P. Gready, Fighting for Human Rights (Routledge, Oxon 2004) 
70 Page 9 
71 Ibid 
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that we see increased legal regulation as an attack on freedom. Such is indicative of the 
underlying UK culture towards law reform that Jack Straw explores in a book that is interesting 
historical record of his time in government. 
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